Wednesday, May 6, 2020

Tom Brady is Washed

Tom Brady is Washed

(This was written before Tom Brady signed with Tampa Bay, sorry Bucs fans) 

With Covid-19 shutting down the sports world we turn to Tom Brady to lead the game-winning drive for content. For the first time in his storied career, Tom Brady is a free agent, and just like a desperate housewife with a hall-pass, he’s ready to mingle with richer and more handsome organizations. Tom Brady at 42 years of age presents an interesting situation as a player who, at times, was the best player in the league, but is coming off a career-worst season. For any of the teams exploring the possibility of signing Brady, proceed with extreme caution. 

2019 being Tom Brady’s worst season ever is an open and shut case, and the areas of decline should cause concern for any of his suitors. Here are the categories where Brady was at his all-time worst: Adjusted yards per attempt (AY/A+), Adjusted net yards per attempt (ANY/A+), Adjusted completion percentage (Cmp%+), Adjusted touchdown percentage (TD%+), and Adjusted passer rating (Rate+). (Why use adjusted stats? Well, Tom Brady has been playing since 2001 and passing stats have inflated massively in the years. Adjusted stats are based upon a league baseline with 100 as league average with higher being better.) Tom Brady was at his worst ever at generating yards, touchdowns, and completions. The only areas where he was not at his worst were Adjusted sack percentage (Sack%+) and Adjusted interception percentage (Int%+). Brady could avoid “negative plays” but struggled to generate “positive plays.” This really sounds like how you would expect a 42-year-old to play a sport where people end up getting paralyzed from colliding with another human. 

Tom Brady is historically good. Some would think that his worst is still better than a lot of players out there right now. Yes, and, no. His worst season, 2019, is a great worst season to have, but it wouldn’t be considered good by anyone's standards (except maybe Bears fans), and barely mediocre if you are into making a bunch of excuses. 

AY/A+
ANY/A+
Cmp%+
TD%+
Rate+
Sack%+
Int%+
2019 
95
100
87
93
95
118
116

Brady is looking more and more like a league average or worse quarterback. Is it just one bad season? 


AY/A+
ANY/A+
Cmp%+
TD%+
Rate+
Sack%+
Int%+
2018
110
115
109
107
110
123
107
2017
118
119
110
112
117
105
116
2016
133
138
119
125
133
123
134

It certainly looks like a slow decline that has picked up a little speed in 2019. Brady’s statistical trend has not been good since 2016, but from 2016 to 2018 Brady did win two super-bowls and a league MVP. If a player has such a high starting point sometimes it’s worth it to have them during their decline. However, Tom has been falling hard and fast. 

Taking the decline, or improvement in some cases, and averaging each season since 2016 to 2019 we can see, hypothetically, where Tom Brady would be expected to be in 2020. 


AY/A+
ANY/A+
Cmp%+
TD%+
Rate+
Sack%+
Int%+
2020
82
87
76
82
82
116
110

That’s not good. In the most layman’s terms ever, the bottom of the graph had to grow from 80 to 60 to fit in 2020’s numbers. To give some perspective here would be some of Tom Brady’s peers in each category, based upon their 2019 statistics. 

AY/A+ : Mitchell Trubitsky & Dwayne Haskins- 82
ANY/A+ : Joe Flacco & Baker Mayfield- 87
Cmp%+ : Dwayne Haskins- 79  
TD%+ : Andy Dalton- 83  
Rate+ : Andy Dalton- 82           
Sack%+ : Mason Rudolph- 112  
Int%+ : Derek Carr- 112 

The question for Tom Brady, and whoever ends up employing him, is how much is Tom Brady worth? When we look at Brady’s most recent level of production it seems clear that Brady is close to league average at Quarterback. Based upon the top 34 QB contracts the average QB is on a 4 year/$62 million contract and around 30 years old. Brady should be in line for $18-$20 million a season, with the number of seasons, realistically, not going beyond two years. Is Tom Brady, at 13 years older than the average NFL QB, worth $36 to $40 million for the next two seasons? Even more important, does Tom Brady think he is worth $36 to $40 million for the next two seasons? The answer to both of these questions is likely no, but unfortunately in diverging directions. Brady most certainly thinks he is better than average and I doubt many teams will line up to give a soon to be 43-year-old close to $20 million a year to see if he, “still has it?”, like Super-Tuesday Joe. Brady’s long-awaited free agency should be frosty as he searches for a top of the market contract with mid-level talent at this stage in his career. 

Tom Brady has had maybe the greatest football career in history. It has been a career that has outlasted anyone’s wildest imaginations when he took over the Patriot’s for a concussed Drew Bledsoe in 2001. Brady, while good in his twenties, was even better in his thirties, with that continuing into his early forties. Brady has seen a serious decline in his play over the last three seasons. The idea that Brady, at 43, will see a bounce-back is doubtful. We tend to afford super-stars long leashes. If Brady plans on playing in 2020 he’ll likely join the long list of great athletes who held on for a bit too long. Watching an athlete’s twilight, as they cling to the one thing that defines them, is nothing but melancholy. Throws will become more and more errant, and mistakes will creep into unfathomable areas. The end is near in 2020. For Tom Brady that is, even if it feels like that for the world too. 

The QB Option: How the Bills Should Set Josh Allen Loose to Unlock His Potential

The nature of professional football lends itself to quick and dramatic turnarounds. Teams can fortify their fortunes in a variety of fashions, from trades and player growth to retirements and injury, to cap casualties, the draft, and schematic overhauls, there are a multitude of avenues to improvement. The past few seasons the Buffalo Bills have been busy checking off these boxes and seem intent on contention in 2020. Last year, fielding a top-3 defense, the Bills reached double-digit wins for the first time in 20 years and finally gave the “Bills Mafia” something to divebomb burning tables to. In an effort to continue their upward trajectory, the Bills made a splash this offseason by trading for Minnesota Vikings wide receiver Stefon Diggs in the hopes of unlocking their young quarterback, Josh Allen. While Diggs is a dynamic receiver, the Bills' best offense for 2020 should be looking to get everything possible out of Allen’s legs, not his arm. 
Josh Allen is a massive human being. Standing 6’5 and weighing 237 pounds Allen could easily be confused with an offensive lineman from yesteryear. Allen is incredibly mobile for his size, and this unique pairing of brute force and agility has made him more valuable as a runner than a thrower. Through his first two seasons, Allen has completed 56.3% of his passes, averaged 184.4 yards per game and thrown for 30 touchdowns, but has rushed for 1141 yards on 5.8 yards per carry and 17 touchdowns. Statistically, Allen looks closer to being an elite running back than quarterback. 
Making matters more bizarre, Allen has been at his best when scrambling. In his rookie season, he averaged 11 yards per scramble and followed that up with 7.3 yards. Allen’s career Yards per passing attempt is only 6.6 yards. The Bills’ offense has been at its best when Allen takes off running on broken passing plays. The West Coast offense popularized the idea of passing the ball to set up the run, but this is not what Bill Walsh had in mind. In the high-stakes world of NFL coaching, it is not ideal to have an offense that works best when broken. 
Allen is clearly a gifted runner based upon how he has performed as a scrambler. Which is what makes how poorly he has performed running the ball in non-scramble situations so surprising. Allen, over his career, has simultaneously picked up 9.2 yards per scramble for 820 yards, but only 3 yards per carry on designed rushes. The Bills offense has wasted two years of Allen’s unique skill set. For a team pushing in their chips to try and claim a Tom Brady-less AFC East an offensive revamp centered on Quarterback’s best attribute might be a good idea, and fortunately for the Bills, run happy quarterbacks are no stranger to success. 
The Bills surely noticed how the Ravens utilized Lamar Jackson to decimate the league. In 2019, Jackson threw for 3,127 yards, rushed for another 1,206, and scored a combined 43 touchdowns en route to the League MVP and a 14-2 record. It was hard to ignore how the Raven’s offense looked to make Jackson as lethal as possible. The Ravens featured the league’s most RPOs (Run-Pass-Option) and, in the process, hitched their wagon to Jackson’s legs. This reliance on a quarterback’s rushing abilities led the Ravens to the league’s most efficient offense and best rushing attack. Their belief in Jackson’s legs forced defenses to commit men to running lanes, in fear of Jackson gashing them for easy yards, only to open up more opportunities for him to attack them through the air. The Ravens picked up more RPO yards than any other team, while the Bills were below league average in just about every RPO and offensive metric. The Ravens bought into their quarterback’s strengths in order to unlock their best offense, and while Josh Allen might not remind anyone of Lamar Jackson, he only trails Lamar Jackson in yards per scramble by .2 yards (9.4 to 9.2), or about 7 inches. 
The Bills are riding high heading into 2020. Coming off of a playoff appearance, the Bills are staring out at an improved roster and weakened division. How far they go will come down to how Josh Allen performs. At this stage in his career, Allen is more dangerous as a runner than a passer. The Ravens doubled down on their mobile quarterback and were rewarded handsomely. For the Bills, reaching their ceiling will come down to them committing to Allen’s legs and not trying to rest on his shoulder.

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

Houston we Have a Problem: How Westbrook for Paul was a Disaster from the Beginning

Houston we Have a Problem: 
How Westbrook for Paul was a Disaster from the Beginning 

Paul George 'Knew' Russell Westbrook-James Harden Pairing Would Work

When the Houston Rockets walked off the court following another defeat to the Golden State Warriors in the summer of 2019 they showed their weariness to coming up short. In a last-ditch effort to finally surround James Harden with enough talent to snag that elusive championship, the Rockets traded Chris Paul along with a cachet of assets to the Oklahoma City Thunder for Russell Westbrook. The idea of a dual MVP backcourt powering the Rockets to glory is certainly seductive, but as of the COVID-19 induced season hiatus, Houston sits at 40-24, the 6 seed in the West, and are owners of the same record as their summer trade partners the Thunder. The narrative at the time of the trade was that the Rockets had upgraded their roster. After about ¾ of the season, it is not clear the Rockets are any better than before and are arguably worse. The Rockets, already on the cusp of greatness, tried to push just a little bit higher and in the process might have cost themselves a chance at the championship they so covet. 
First things first (Weekdays at 6:30 on FS1), Chris Paul is better at basketball than Russell Westbrook. While I imagine that this is a hot take for some, the gulf in production is staggeringly in favor of Paul. He holds a statistical edge in almost every phase of the game over Westbrook. The only areas where Westbrook beats Paul is in USG%, FTr, and TRB%. While Westbrook wildly gobbles up boxscore stats, Paul surgically dissects defenses. The contrast in style is like the difference between a symphony hall and a moshpit. As much fun as Westbrook is to watch he is not close to being the player Paul is.
(Top is Chris Paul, Bottom is Russell Westbrook      = Better)

       Paul’s superiority is in his efficiency, Westbrook’s is in his volume. Westbrook commands much more of the ball which has led to him having better counting stats than Paul. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Points per game. Westbrook has a career average of 23.2 PTS compared to Paul’s 18.5 PTS, but that’s on the back of 18.8 FGA to Paul’s 13.8. On a point per shot basis Paul beats Westbrook 1.34 to 1.23. If it’s a make or miss league then this is a blacktop brick from Houston. 
While Chris Paul’s Hall of Fame credentials are unassailable, at 34 years old he is on the back half of his career. Westbrook meanwhile is only 31, and the conventional wisdom is that he has more high-value seasons left in the tank. We may treat mid-30’s NBA superstars like it’s Logan Run, but the reality is that most players, barring serious injury, have steady declines. Paul and Westbrook are not likely headed for a dramatic turn for the worse. What is more likely is a gradual degradation in production. So while Westbrook almost certainly has more remaining seasons than Paul, as you’ll see, it’s unlikely they’ll be more productive ones. 
Both Chris Paul and Russell Westbrook conveniently entered the league at their age 20 seasons. Paul hit the ground running and performed at an All-Star level as a rookie before blossoming into an MVP caliber player at age 22 and maintaining that form for the next decade, before starting his slow decline. Westbrook, conversely, started slowly, but, just like Paul, made his first All-Star game in his age 22 seasons. Westbrook continued to play at a similar level from 22 to 26, before jump-starting a run of three consecutive MVP caliber seasons in 2014-15. While Paul is definitely in decline, so is Westbrook, and more concerning, his decline started much earlier in his career than Paul's. When their Win-Shares are compared, (10 Win shares usually leads to a top-10 season, 15 WS is top-3) on a year to year basis, Paul has been the superior player at almost every stage.

What is staggering is how good both Westbrook and Paul have been. Both have spent the majority of their career producing like a top-10 player, but Paul has spent much more time flirting with the top than Westbrook. If Russell Westbrook ages like Chris Paul he’ll be roughly the same player he was the last few seasons. The only problem for the Rockets is that Paul was a better player, to begin with. During his two year stint with the Rocket, he produced 16.8 WS in only 116 games, while Westbrook produced 16.9 WS in 153 games over the same time frame. Paul has shown that when on the court, he is still a better player than Westbrook. His Win/Shares per 48 minutes have outpaced Westbrook every season, and while his availability has waned in recent years his efficiency has remained incredible. With his lead over Westbrook being even more obvious.
      Paul, for his career, has averaged .244 WS/48. Westbrook’s best single-season, 2015-16, was .245 WS/48. Paul, by starting higher, has much more room to fall. It is why only good players are able to play for 20 seasons. Paul won’t be an MVP in the 2020s, but Russell Westbrook won’t either, and over the next three seasons, there’s a better chance he’ll be the better of the two. 
Looking back at his Houston years, Paul averaged .218 WS/48 over his tenure. Over that same period, Westbrook averaged .146 WS/48. In terms of efficiency both produced at about 90% of their career averages over the period, but Paul’s average season is 66% better than Westbrook’s (.244 WS/48 compared to .161 WS/48). In general, it’s better to have 90% of something that’s 66% better. From a production standpoint it seems that this trade was never going to be an upgrade for Houston, but, as in life, production, in the NBA, is relative to cost. 
Report: James Harden, Chris Paul to Face Russell Westbrook in the ...

The most defensible component of the trade for Houston centered on Paul’s contract. Owed almost $80 million over the next two seasons (2019-20 & 2020-21) with a $44 million player option for the 2021-22 season, when he would be 37 years old, and you can see why the Rockets would explore trading Paul. The only problem is that Westbrook is owed almost the exact same amount of money over the same two seasons but with an additional year before he has a player option of $46 million for the 2022-23 season. The Rockets went from potentially owing a 34-year-old player $124 million over 3 years to definitely owing a 31 year old $123 million over 3 years with a likely fourth year at $46 million. In terms of money, Houston made out worse, and that’s even before draft capital is taken into account. 

In order to get Westbrook from the Oklahoma City Thunder, the Rockets had to not only surrender Chris Paul but also first-round picks in 2024 and 2026 as well as the right to swap picks in 2021 and 2025. While there are some protections on the picks, that is an awful lot to give up for a player that is not better or cheaper. One could argue that 2024 and 2026 are a long way away, and they would be right, but draft picks can easily be used to get things for today. Whatever marginal upgrade they felt Westbrook and his contract gave them over Paul can easily be offset by what losing those picks as trade assets cost them. Houston’s trade of Paul for Westbrook, on its own, doesn’t look good for Houston, but neither Paul or Westbrook are what make Houston go. That distinction belongs to James Harden. 

Harden is possibly the best player in the league and has been for some stretch. He has led the league in scoring the past three seasons and Win Shares 5 of the past 6. The only players in history to lead the league in Win Shares for 5 different seasons are Harden, Lebron James, Michael Jordan, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Wilt Chamberlain, and Neil Johnston. Harden is an iso-heavy usage monster that produces on offense like Michael Jordan (seriously they have the same career offensive rating per 100 possessions at 118). He is the ultimate offensive force and should have the ball in his hands as much as possible, which makes acquiring Russell Westbrook an all the more baffling decision for the Rockets. 
NBA roundup: James Harden, Chris Paul lead Rockets to rout of ...
 Over the past few seasons, James Harden and Russell Westbrook have been pushing the outer limits of Usage for an NBA player. Both have led the league in the metric and been mainstays in the top 10, and, just to hammer home the point, the pair own the two highest single-season usage rates in NBA history. Meanwhile, Paul owns a career usage rate of 23.9%, well below both Westbrook at 32.7% and Harden at 30.7%. An NBA team having two high usage players is not a death sentence, but when both players are at their best when sporting a high usage rate, it is not the most thoughtful roster construction. The way they play Harden and Westbrook can both be individually great, but neither of their styles elevates the other. In many ways, Westbrook is just a less good version of Harden, and Paul’s playing style and ability complimented Harden’s much better than Westbrook’s does. When every edge counts you want your two best players to make each other better, and it appears Houston willfully parted with that. 

During Paul’s two seasons in Houston, the Rockets won 65 and 53 games. While they weren’t able to find postseason success, that had more to do with the Golden State Warriors dynastic run than with their team. Following injuries to Klay Thompson and the departure of Kevin Durant from Golden State the Rockets main adversary, at least temporarily, had been vanquished from within. The Rockets could have reasonably decided to run it back one more time with Chris Paul in the fold and try to make a push for a championship just as they had done the previous two years. The addition of Westbrook has not spurned the Rockets to perform any better. They have a slightly worse winning percentage this year (.625) compared to last (.646), and in a last-ditch effort to maximize their roster traded Clint Capela, Nene, Gerald Green, and their 2020 first-round pick for Robert Covington. That’s coupled with Westbrook having his worst season since he was 21 and Paul bouncing back into the periphery of the top 10. The Thunder are no doubt overjoyed by their end of the deal, considering how their last blockbuster trade with Houston went. 
        In the Summer of 2012, Houston kicked open a championship window when they acquired, none other than, James Harden from Oklahoma City in a deal that looked an absolute heist at the time and proved to be even greater. The Thunder’s trade had propelled the Rockets into the stars, and, ironically, it may be another trade with the Thunder that will see them come back to earth. Houston got the bad end of the trade in just about every way. Giving up picks and the better player to get a worse contract, the Rockets now find themselves with a worse record and fewer assets. Not only is the team worse this season, but it will be depleted for seasons to come. 

The Rockets will tell themselves their championship window is still open, but Harden and Westbrook are 30 and 31, have logged incredible amounts of minutes, and are high usage players. With no draft capital, the Rockets have little ability to add talent and it’s unlikely another superstar player would want to enter a situation with two high-priced high-usage guards entering the twilights of their primes. The Rockets are not good enough now to win a championship and have few if any, avenues to improve. The Rockets missed their chance at a championship with Chris Paul, and by trading him away it all but closes the book on them competing for one in Harden’s prime. 

Tuesday, May 28, 2019

It's the Economy, Stupid: The Economic Ramifications of Abortion


            Morality has cast a long shadow over the abortion debate in the United States. Politicians and their constituents have dug deep trenches as to how they view the morality of abortion. Conservatives feel it is immoral to kill an unborn human life, while Liberals have insisted that it is immoral for the government to control the bodies of women. What is obvious is that neither side has made much headway with each other using their ‘moral’ argument. I see another route to create some common ground over the issue. For all of the talk about the morality of abortion, why are the economic ramifications not raised?
            When election time comes the economy is usually one of voters primary concerns. In a Gallup poll spanning from October of 2018 to April of 2019, the economy was viewed as the third most important problem facing the country behind poor leadership/ the government and immigration. People care about the economy when they head to the polls. It helps them decide who they will support and what policies they want. Yet, when it comes to abortion this, usually, important factor seems to go to the wayside. For men and women alike the economics of abortions should be one of their primary concerns.
            Economies at their barebones are about people. What people decide to make. What people decide to buy. What people do. Abortions or lack thereof have the ability to add or subtract a person from the economy. Yet, with all the focus on the fetus, there is little concern for the mother. The economic impact of having an abortion doesn’t stop at the fetus. Which raises the question; how does having a child affect the economic outcome of the mother?
            The gender pay gap in western nations has been closing but has yet to be demolished. For something that the world’s most powerful nations have been trying to curb why has it remained so persistent? The answer is motherhood. Mothers earn dramatically less than women without kids. Gender discrimination in pay, historically, is relatively small today until a woman has a child. Which, brings us back to the abortion debate. Women become economically less powerful the moment they have a child. Suddenly, a moral debate becomes a debate of dollars and cents.
            When society limits women’s access to abortion, they are in fact limiting their access to economic mobility and prosperity. Whatever the rationale is for paying mothers less the reality still remains the same. A study in Denmark, a country with a similar gender pay-gap as the United States, found that women, after having their first child, earned close to 20% less than they had prior to having their child. What is even more striking is that the decrease in pay is not a short-term setback, but rather, sets a course for women to earn far less over the next decade. Women would not reach the level of pay seen prior to their pregnancy until 6 years after the birth of their child. (I found these graphics from a New York Times article from February 2018 on the subject)
 
            The reasons why this pay-gap emerges or exists is of little consequence as it is a reality that is only faced by women. As seen in the next chart, men do not see any real decrease in pay by becoming a father compared to remaining childless.

It is a sad sight that women, by bringing future generations into existence, are economically punished. The fact that Denmark, a country with strong subsidies for childcare, sees this dramatic of a turn in the economic fortunes of its women due to childbirth should raise concern for Americans.
            The decision to be 'pro' or 'anti' abortion should not be exclusively viewed through a moral prism. We ask about the morality of the economy, and thus we should question the economy of morality. When women are denied an abortion and have a child as a result, their economic future is dramatically altered to their detriment. Is it moral to have an abortion? Is it moral for a woman to have to earn less for having a child? Is it moral for the government to decide? These are all difficult questions for people, but we should not turn a blind eye to the economic realities of motherhood simply because it is not deemed a moral question. I’ll ask one more question. How moral does it feel to have money taken away from you over a decision you could not make?